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CHAPTER 11: 
Conclusion 
ROBERT AUNGER 
 
This book seeks to determine whether the idea of memes might provide the foundation for a progressive 
line of research on cultural diversification and evolution. In this, the concluding chapter, I don’t intend to 
make the definitive statement concerning the future of memetics. Rather, I attempt to make sense of 
what has gone before, and to find where there might be grounds for coming down on one side or 
another of the key issues identified by the authors of the preceding chapters. My comments will be 
arranged by academic discipline, as it is from these varying perspectives that problems naturally come 
into view. Indeed, the entire book is arranged -- by default -- in a similar fashion. It works out (roughly 
speaking) that meme promoters, put first in this book, tend to be biological in background or inclination, 
while the more critical voices dominating the later chapters tend to come from psychology and especially 
the social sciences. I follow the same order in setting out my comments here. 
 
Evolutionary theory   
Given its origin in the work of the zoologist and evolutionary theorist Richard Dawkins, the memetics 
literature has continued to exhibit the strong influence of evolutionary biology. Many of the problems with 
pursuing this line of research therefore arise from the analogy made between genes as the biological 
replicator and memes as its cultural equivalent.   
 
Explaining cultural similarity 
Just because the “meme meme” has been highly successful in popular culture and has even appeared 
in the Oxford English Dictionary, it has not yet been established whether memes are a subject worthy of 
scientific study. The approval of journalists and British lexicographers merely reflects common usage, 
and establishes memes as a viable folk psychological concept. However, we cannot be certain that 
memes -- considered as a scientific concept -- exist.    
Why is this? Let’s step back a second and take a look at what distinguishes memetics from alternative 
theories. Memetics asserts that we can take a “meme’s-eye-view” with respect to the diffusion of culture. 
The obvious implication is that there is a previously unnoticed agent participating in social 
communication -- something besides just the sender and receiver that needs to be accounted for. In 
effect, memetics postulates the existence of an evolutionary agent -- a replicator -- that evolves in 
accordance with its own interests (which may be independent from those of either the sender or receiver 
of messages). Most would identify this agent as the message itself. So a meme must be thought of as a 
replicator which is active during social communication in such a way that it can influence its own 
reproduction. The problem is that no one has yet identified bits of information with these qualities.  
Why posit the existence of such a thing? Because the fact of cultural similarity needs explaining. 
Everyone has had the experience of someone else expressing opinions similar to their own or behaving 
like they do. This suggests there are multiple copies of the information underlying that belief or behavior 
in the population. But how did this commonality arise? Was the relevant information transmitted to them 
by others? Or perhaps similar environments caused commonly-held information -- information placed in 
people’s heads at birth by genetic inheritance -- to be expressed by anyone in that situation. Or perhaps 
each individual learned the relevant piece of information through earlier experiences with their natural 
surroundings, without having communicated with anyone or possessing that knowledge innately. In 
effect, there are three standard explanations for cultural similarity:  
 • transmission (cultural evolution through social learning)  
• genes (biological evolution), and  
• individual learning (which is convergent evolution through the analogue of mutation from a 
cultural perspective).  
 
Memetics is associated with the first of these. So what we require to prefer the memeticists’ explanation 
of cultural similarity is proof that cultures evolve thanks to the non-genetic inheritance of information. The 
problem, then, is eliminating the other mechanisms (just outlined) which might underlie the regeneration 
of cultural traits over time, but which do not involve a cultural replicator -- or, indeed, social learning of 
any kind. How can we discriminate between these alternatives?  
The more radical evolutionary psychologists (e.g., Tooby and Cosmides 1992) favor the gene option. 
They would minimize the role of transmission altogether, emphasizing instead the stimulation of innate 
mental content by potentially simple ecological stimuli. In essence, they believe “cultural” traits are 
already in the brain, with only an environmental spark required for them to be expressed. What remains 
to be explained from the evolutionary psychological perspective is not social transmission dynamics, but 
recall dynamics: what kinds of responses do different environments cause to arise? Boyd and Richerson 
(this volume) disposed of this possibility by arguing that the corpus of human knowledge accumulates 
too rapidly to be purely genetic in origin. So it seems unlikely that genes -- through the instrument of the 
adapted mind -- will single-handedly account for culture. Boyd and Richerson (this volume) also claimed 
that individual learning in similar environments is an inadequate explanation of cultural similarity, 
because groups living in the same environment display different suites of cultural traits. This seems, 
therefore, to leave us with only the cultural transmission explanation -- in effect, memes must be invoked 
to explain cultural similarity. So what’s all the fuss about? 
In fact, there is another possibility (which is not standard, so I didn’t include it above): niche construction 
and ecological inheritance (see Laland and Odling-Smee, this volume). Cultural groups living side-by-
side may not be living in the same effective environment, because they have modified their natural 
surroundings in distinct ways. In this case, people learn their cultural traits through interactions with 
artefacts, rather than other people. Cultural groups living in the same environment differ, in this view, not 
because they learn the beliefs and values which distinguish them from each other, but because they are 
influenced by artefacts inherited from previous generations. These can even be types of artefacts which 
do not communicate information from ancestors to the present-day inhabitants of those environments 
(like books do). Instead, they could take the form of tools and the “built” environment, which only 
indirectly influence attitudes and beliefs. So by invoking our ability to manipulate the environment over 
the long term (an ability we share with many other species), we can continue to discount the role of 
memes in explaining culture acquisition -- even in the face of rapid technological improvements such as 
surround us today. The feed-forward effects of ecological inheritance, coupled with big, evolved brains 
able to manipulate the information stored by the activity of previous generations in the environment, can 
in principle explain the similarity within, and differences between, cultural groups.1  
 
Indirect evidence of memes? 
In the face of these competing schools of thought, each with vocal and sophisticated adherents, I 
suggest that for the memetic hypothesis to be favored, we require evidence of some kind that memes 
exist. This evidence can either be direct or indirect. From indirect evidence, one can infer the existence 
of memes from the marks their activity leaves behind in the world; direct evidence would show us where 
memes are and what they look like. 
Good indirect evidence for memes would consist of establishing that there is an independent dynamic to 
cultural change which cannot be assigned to the goal-directed activity of people. One would need to 
observe a directionality to cultural change which reflects the interests of a replicator battling with genes 
for control over human behavior -- memes. This is why memes are comonly invoked to explain 
maladaptive cultural traits, why advocates often gravitate toward examples of memes which seem 
“irrational” for individuals (like celibacy), and why memes get equated with viruses, to prompt the 
implication of induced morbidity in “hosts.” The problem is that -- except for the odd trait here and there -
- culture is overwhelmingly adaptive for people, allowing our species to dominate our home planet in 
fairly spectacular fashion. If memes are parasites, they must be symbiotic ones.  
So, if memes exist, it is more likely that the course of human evolution should reflect the increasingly 
interdependent interests of genes and memes. An increasingly effective mutualism between these 
replicators should result in the human species becoming able to explore new ecological niches, thanks 
to the additional functionality granted to humans by their relationship to the memetic symbiont. In effect, 
contemporary humans should be exploiting a broader evolutionary “design space” -- or range of life-
ways in which they can thrive -- than was possible before memes came along.  
The obvious manifestation of synergistic niche expansion through gene-meme cooperation is the rapid 
increase in technological improvements associated with civilization. Indeed, this is what many would say 
is the best kind of indirect evidence for the operation of memes -- their (unspecified) role in artefact 
development (e.g., Gabora 1997).2  Boyd and Richerson’s examples (this volume) of incremental 
improvements in tools such as compasses would seem to prove that a series of artefactual forms can 
exhibit descent with modification -- or the passing of information through a chain of exemplars, forming 
lineages of information transfer and duplication. After all, such intricate implements show evidence of 
design, or adaptation to particular functions.  
But there are still two kinds of explanations for such obvious design. Does it arise because the best-
performing tools are artificially selected by people to reflect their own needs? Or alternatively, is their 
design the “natural” outcome of independent replicators (memes again) working to achieve a higher 
probability of replication -- primarily by becoming more useful to people? In other words, Does the 
evolution of technology reflect the will of people or the interests of symbiotic memes? It should be 
apparent that it would be very difficult to tease such closely twinned hypotheses apart. 
Nevertheless, some memeticists identify artefacts as memes (e.g., Blackmore 1999; Conte, this volume; 
Sperber, this volume). Do artefacts fill the bill? As Sperber (this volume) has forcefully argued, three 
criteria are required for replication -- causal efficacy, similarity, and inheritance. Sperber explicitly means 
to exclude cases of reconstruction from memetics through the criterion of inheritance. Inheritance here 
means that the information leading to the copy being produced must be acquired from the source, rather 
than having the recipient reconstruct the requisite information for itself. This criterion must hold true 
whether memes are defined as being in the head or in the form of artefacts.  
In fact, there seems to be an impressive array of mechanical replicators out there -- chain letters, 
photocopies, FAXes -- which meet all of Sperber’s criteria for replication. Let’s take the case of web-
page downloads. Lots of web-pages get visited by Internet “surfers,” but only in a few instances is the 
information found there downloaded to the surfer’s local hard disk. Presumably, it is some aspect of the 
content of those pages which triggers the download -- and hence the replication of that content. 
Software ensures that the copying process, based on source information, is high-fidelity.  
From the “artefact’s-eye-view,” this is replication, with people placed solely in the role of catalysts for the 
process. Photocopying is perhaps a more straight-forward example: ink-on-paper serves as a template 
for the copy; there is no phenotypic conversion involved. Indeed, the copying process is just like meiosis: 
direct replication of the memetic genotype, ink-network to ink-network. Whether anyone reads the copy 
is immaterial. People are only needed to push the copy button on the machine. (Computer viruses 
replicate through networked computers with even less human involvement.)  The important thing is that 
there are more copies of the artefact around at the end of the exercise. No replication of information 
need occur in brains during the process, since each push of the copy button may be produced by some 
previously-installed mental rule about what to find appealing on the piece of paper.  
To see artefacts as replicators, we must make a mental flip of perspective, to see the world as the 
replicator sees it. Dawkins (1976) taught us that we must often think of the biological process from the 
genetic replicator’s point of view (which sometimes means that individual organisms become almost 
invisible -- as in the case of oncogenes, which reproduce themselves through a renegade cell lineage 
expanding at some cost to the individual’s health). So too, from the replicating artefact’s point of view, 
these substances -- rather than being external stores of information for the use of people, or aids to 
getting memes from one brain to another -- become the focus of a replication story. What is crucial to 
photocopying, for example, is the original on the glass, the spinning electrostatic drum, and the push of 
the copy button. The massive human brain is relegated in this story to the trivial task of button-pusher 
(which a simple-minded automaton could also do). Artefacts can in fact inherit information from other 
artefacts, and “a scholar is just a library’s way of making another library” (Dennett 1995:346).  
Memeticists (like Blackmore 1999, this volume) have invoked mental memes to explain the evolution of 
technology like photocopiers, but now we have just the reverse: the suggestion that technological 
replicators are being produced without a necessary role for mental replicators. The “best” evidence for 
memes -- the evolution of modern technology -- turns out to be an instance of replication from another 
point of view, and hence cannot be used to support the hypothesis of brain-to-brain replication. Rather, 
technological replication falls into the category of niche construction. Laland and Odling-Smee’s 
ecological inheritance (this volume) may occur through such instances of artefact replication (although it 
can also occur through the mere survival of existing artefacts, if they last longer than a human 
generation). And the evolution of the large human brain -- a conundrum supposedly explained by 
memes inciting the construction of a bigger home for themselves, according to Blackmore (1999, this 
volume) -- turns out to be unnecessary for that process to occur, and so must be due to some other 
cause. 
It thus appears that replication is happening all over the place -- inside cells (genes), between proteins 
(prions), and in the environment (artefactual replication). The irony is that it may not be happening in the 
way originally envisioned by Dawkins -- through social learning. Mind-to-mind replication may in fact be 
the least likely mechanism for replication (see the section on memetic phenotypes below). Indeed, 
whether memes exist in minds remains an open question. Certainly, no model in the memetic literature 
which makes a brain the site of replication meets Sperber’s criteria.3  
A terminological question now crops up: Should we call this technological replication of patterns on 
paper or in hard disks a memetic process? Certainly, the information in these patterns does not replicate 
via imitation, even broadly conceived, and therefore does not fit the original Dawkins/Blackmore 
definition. If culture is composed of information in people’s heads, then the duplication of artefacts 
doesn’t necessarily help us to explain culture. People may learn from these artefacts or not. Because the 
present book concerns memes as a contender for the explanation of cultural evolution, I will restrict my 
use of the word meme to information replicated through social learning (its original context), and leave 
the question of what to call the technological replication of artefacts to others.  
 
Direct evidence of memes? 
So our search for indirect evidence of memes actually led to the discovery of artefactual replicators and 
grim forebodings about the need for, or existence of, brain-based memes. We come down, I think, to the 
need for direct evidence of memes-in-minds to prefer the meme hypothesis for explaining culture. Since 
memes are replicators, they must be defined essentially by their means of replication, which should be 
distinct and independent from those of other replicators (including artefacts). Thus, in my view, the case 
for memes cannot be made without reference to a mechanism by which information is faithfully 
replicated through social transmission.  
What does “mechanism of replication” mean in this context? By definition, it is the means by which 
information exerts some influence over the probability of it being reproduced (Dawkins 1982:83). One 
could go further and require a specification of the various resources and their roles in the replication 
process -- the steps leading to the product being assembled, and their speed -- but that is no doubt a 
task for the future.  
I therefore conclude that only by finding a mechanism of replication which generates the similarity 
between people’s beliefs and values can instances of inheritance-through-transmission be conclusively 
distinguished from something like the genetic or developmentalist (evolutionary psychological) 
alternative. This makes Blackmore's “existence proof” for memes, as presented in her contribution, 
unacceptable. It is based simply on the dictionary definition of memes, with a note that this definition 
implies memes are replicators. In fact, the involvement of memes in the maintenance and diffusion of 
mental culture remains an open question.  
So I submit that meme-promoters will only be proven right about cultural inheritance when someone 
finds a meme. Nothing except seeing identifiable memes in action is likely to convince people sitting on 
the other side of the fence that memetics is the best option.  
I also think it will be difficult to find a meme without specifying what the search is looking for, and where. 
Hull (this volume) says we don’t need to have a crystal clear definition of memes in order to work with 
them. He (and Blackmore 1999:56) cite the oft-mentioned parallel example of genes: that purely 
operational definitions of genes during the first part of the twentieth century were sufficient for good 
science to be done. Unlocalized, metaphorical units of inheritance were certainly enough for Darwin to 
sweep all contenders aside in the nineteenth century, given the logical force of his argument for natural 
selection as a mechanism. So Hull’s admonition to contemporary would-be memeticists is simply to go 
out and collect evidence of memetic activity in the social world.  
Is that going to be good enough? I suggest not. In my view, the situation with respect to cultural 
inheritance is not the same as that for genes because genes are already established as a mechanism 
for informational inheritance. Once genes are on the scene, all inheritance, including cultural, might 
already be accounted for (although I agree with Boyd and Richerson that this is unlikely). If not, then we 
still have the option of invoking ecological inheritance. So identifying a more-than-operational meme and 
its mechanism of replication are both necessary before memetics can get off the ground. Only by 
providing a physical model of meme replication can memetics take its rightful position in the list of 
replicators covered by what Hull terms “general selection theory.” Until then, they remain simply an 
analogy to the better-known case of genes.4 
 
Memetic phenotypes and the communication problem 
Even if we ignore these empirical difficulties, major problems remain in meme theory. One is 
establishing how the genotype/phenotype distinction might work for memes. This distinction is crucial 
because brains don’t directly infect each other with bits of brain-stuff; rather, they use signals or 
messages instead. Brain-to-brain transmission therefore necessarily involves the translation of memetic 
information from brain language to signal language, from one form or code to another, and back again. I 
will call this the “communication problem.” 
There is also another reason memetics should concern itself with establishing what a memetic 
phenotype might be. The functional distinction between genotype/phenotype in the genetic system has 
been generalized by Dawkins and Hull as the replicator/interactor distinction (see my Introduction). 
Although it is possible for a replicator to also serve as an interactor (as ribosomes do, for example), such 
a situation is generally considered unlikely to persist. This is because replicators and interactors have 
fundamentally different roles to play in the evolutionary drama (as store of information and as 
survivor/transmitter, respectively), and it is usually inefficient for the same entity to play both roles. So a 
competitor system with independent replicators and interactors would almost certainly win out in an 
evolutionary race, if only because a more specialized replicator would likely be more robust in its ability 
to duplicate itself. If memes are considered well-developed replicators, then memeticists will have to 
develop a notion of a memetic interactor, or “phemotype” (by analogy to the biological phenotype). While 
there are a number of contenders for this role, none has achieved widespread recognition. 
Part of the problem with developing a rigorous notion of a memetic interactor is coming up with a 
criterion which surely identifies it as distinct from its progenitor, the memetic replicator. David Hull (this 
volume) put forward one criterion for making the distinction between a replicator and its interactor which 
is generalizable regardless of substrate (and thus a candidate for Universal Darwinism): the relative 
difficulty of reconstituting the replicator from an interactor. This is a generalization of the Weismannian 
notion that, in informational terms, you can’t go “backwards” from protein to gene. Such an inability 
arises because there tends to be some slop in the production of phenotypes: genes don’t code for one 
phenotype, they code for a gradient of possible variant forms (what biologists call a reaction norm), 
thanks to the impact of environmental conditions on development. So the relationship between 
replicators and their products is not one-to-one. This implies that information will be lost in the translation 
from meme to phemotype. It is this loss of information which makes the project of “reverse engineering” 
(or inferring the assembly instructions from seeing the product, as Susan Blackmore puts it) so difficult. 
Clearing up what is a cultural replicator and what is a cultural interactor will also go some way toward 
avoiding the perennial confusion surrounding “Lamarkianism” in cultural evolution. Since the Lamarkian 
principle involves the inheritance of phenotypic variation, determining whether cultural evolution is 
Lamarkian depends on distinguishing between memotype and phemotype. Memes may change code or 
form during transmission, but cultural inheritance will be Lamarkian only if the meme is in phemotypic 
(informationally-compromised) form during transmission. In this case, the meme-recipient will acquire a 
phemotypic variant. So making the proper distinction between replicator and interactor forms is crucial 
for basic understanding in memetics.  
However, this leaves us in an unfortunate quandary -- at least so long as we use information loss as the 
criterion for identifying the phenotypic form of a replicator. This quandary arises because, as Hull (this 
volume) notes, without a clear idea of what memetic information is -- that is, how the information in a bit 
of writing differs from the information in the piece of paper on which it is written -- we don’t have a good 
way of determining when it is being lost. If we insist on using information loss as the defining criterion of 
interactors, progress in memetics will be inhibited until we know how this loss occurs.  
Dan Sperber has argued that it is hard for a replicator to solve the problem of information loss during 
social communication. Artefactual replicators in the form of ink on paper can duplicate with very high 
fidelity: using photocopiers, we have direct replicator-replicator reproduction, and consequently no loss 
of information. However, as noted earlier, since bits of brain don’t themselves make the journey from 
one head to another, the memetic life cycle requires that memes be translated from some neuronal 
construct into another form for social transmission -- for example, into parts of speech. Thus, memetic 
replication cycles involve stages of translation from one code and substrate to another. Since translation 
is rarely perfect, ths implies that information leakage should regularly occur. 
The problem with this is that, if speech is a phemotype, then it is compromised as a message carrier 
(this is the famous Chomskian “poverty of the stimulus” argument concerning linguistic message-
passing). But then, for the sender’s intent to be properly communicated, the receiver must compensate 
for this information loss by engaging in some kind of reconstitution of the message’s intended meaning. 
However, if there is significant reconstruction of the information content of a meme by each host brain, 
then the likelihood of message replication is low, thanks to the vagaries of how each brain processes in-
coming information (due to the different background information individuals have acquired, the 
inferencing algorithms they use, etc.).  
One way out of this problem, suggested by Sperber, would be for the brain to have a general decoder -- 
a utility enabling it to reliably infer the intention of the sender, and hence the substance of the message, 
regardless of any intervening noise during transmission or idiosyncracies of sender coding and 
production. In this view, brains should have evolved filters to assess the utility of information coming in 
from the social environment to keep us from rapidly being swamped with bad information (or duped into 
stupid behaviors by people with ulterior motives). This normalizing inferential machine might also ensure 
the replication of memetic material during social transmission. However, its operation is unlikely to be 
perfect, so a high mutation rate remains a potential problem. 
The need to communicate memes between brains through intermediaries also introduces another, more 
fundamental, complication. If psychological normalization of memetic inputs is important for successful 
communication, then memetic information is not, strictly speaking, inherited because it is not passed 
from person A to person B. Instead, the similarity of socially-acquired information between individuals 
has another cause: inherently structured inferential processing by the brain (Sperber, this volume). 
These reconstructive processes depend on a long history of genetic selection on the human cortex, not 
the passing of information from person to person in cultural lines of descent. In effect, the cause of the 
similarity between the information in A’s and B’s brains is the result of evolutionary psychology, not 
memetics. Since the causes are different, one can expect the population-level dynamics to also be 
different, thanks to differing rates of mutation or types of selection, for example. This creates a 
fundamental problem for memetics as an inheritance process (the general view of memetics).   
However, the memetic process -- even if dependent on error-correction routines in the brain to produce 
the cultural similarity of beliefs and values -- still confers an evolutionary advantage. This is because the 
same information is acquired through transmission-plus-correction more efficiently and cost effectively 
than individual learning through trial-and-error could have done (Dan Dennett, personal communication.). 
Further, error correction is an important aspect of genetic inheritance as well, so replicator systems can 
operate with such assistance without having to be called something else. 
Susan Blackmore (personal communication) notes that Sperber’s reasoning leads to the expectation 
that, if there is a cultural replicator, there should also be selection for improved mechanisms for its 
transmission over time. In this way, the reliance on reconstituting information from local resources each 
iteration would be reduced and the proportion of information actually being transmitted increased. Her 
presumption is that this is indeed what has happened during the major transitions in cultural evolution, 
such as language, writing, and computer-based communication. But whether these have increased the 
transmissability of memes, or merely their copying fidelity, remains to be determined.  
 
Psychology 
Another major set of issues concerns the psychology of memes.  
 
Must we go inside? 
A fundamental question in this domain is whether memetics can proceed without a clear idea of what 
kinds of transformations memes might undergo during storage and retrieval by brains. Can memetics 
leave the brain as a black box, and deal only with social transmission aspects? The virtue of ignoring 
psychology is that we need not worry about something we don’t know too much about anyway: how the 
brain processes information. This is the line taken by Blackmore and Hull (this volume), who argue that 
memetics can cheerfully ignore what is going on inside people’s heads because the real action is 
happening in the social sphere, or at the level of the population. Boyd and Richerson (this volume), 
sensing difficulties in this area for memetics -- that the psychological mechanisms underlying inheritance 
are likely to be messy and remain largely unknown -- shy away from these particulars. They claim that 
however the psychological side of things plays out, cultural evolution can nevertheless be seen as a 
Darwinian process from the level of the population: each generation somehow has to cause information 
to get stored in the brains of subsequent generations. And it is true that whatever is happening “inside” 
can be glossed as some kind of decision-making bias favoring one variant over another during 
transmission (which is effectively what gene-culture coevolutionary models do). But this does not very 
effectively limit the kinds of models which need to be investigated. 
Further, if memetics disregards psychology, and there are major transformative processes at work in the 
brain, then memetics is only explaining part of the cultural evolutionary process. Since the survival of a 
meme might depend on an interaction between what happens to it inside and outside the brain, by 
ignoring one half of the picture memeticists may get the part they explicitly deal with -- the public or 
social part -- empirically wrong. Psychologically-oriented memeticists generally feel that no social theory, 
including memetics, can succeed without a proper psychological underpinning.  
So, if we agree that we must have a mechanism producing similarity (as I argued above), then we can 
answer the question of whether memetics must involve itself in psychological issues. The answer is yes: 
it is crucial that we learn how we learn to become culturally competent members of society. Conte, 
Sperber and Plotkin are right, in my view, in this respect. I thus conclude that memetics must peek inside 
people’s heads. Score a point for the psychologists. 
Unfortunately, psychologically “realistic” population-level models of the cultural evolutionary process -- 
whether analytic, or the sort of computer-based simulations preferred by Conte -- remain for the future. 
This is because few social psychologists are interested in filling in the picture with regard to transmission 
biases, so the wait for greater psychological realism may be a long one. 
 
Imitation 
Related to the issue of how memes might replicate is the relationship of memetics to imitation. Two inter-
connected questions pop up here. First, Is a complicated brain essential for imitation?  This issue is 
important because it determines who gets to have memes: only complex intentional agents like people, 
or more lowly creatures without cortices, such as birds?  Many (including Plotkin) argue that there is no 
consensus concerning the psychological mechanisms of imitation. This is significant because, as Conte 
(this volume) says, you cannot define imitation without reference to the mental abilities involved. Using 
behavior as the sole criterion leads to confounds. For example, automatic contagion (such as yawning 
when others do) is direct phenotypic copying without the inferencing of mental contents. Counting 
contagion as a kind of imitation suggests that agents don’t need to correctly infer another’s intention 
(plus her beliefs and needs, etc.) in order to adopt or imitate her behaviors. What psychological 
resources imitation demands remains unknown.   
The second aspect of the imitation question is a point on which many here voiced an opinion, so it 
appears to be central: Should memetic transmission be restricted to imitation? Blackmore, citing 
Dawkins as an authority, restricts memetics to cases of imitative behavior because, she asserts, only 
imitation serves as a direct copying process, and if memetics is to be founded on replication events, then 
only imitation can be counted as a memetic mechanism. But as we have just seen, the jury is still out on 
whether imitation is behavior copying or mental state inferencing (as assumed in the “theory of mind” 
literature). This leaves Blackmore’s contention somewhat up in the air. Partly on these grounds, Boyd 
and Richerson, Conte, Hull, Laland and Odling-Smee, and Plotkin make attacks -- at least in passing -- 
at Blackmore’s position on this issue. It seems that numbers, at least, are against her in this respect. 
The counter-proposals of Laland and Odling-Smee, Plotkin and Conte are particularly compelling, 
coming as they do from within the psychological fraternity.  
Thus, there is little support for Blackmore’s contention that memetics should be limited to imitation 
because imitation is the only mechanism which can support good replication. It may turn out that directly 
modelling the behavior of others is not more efficient than independent learning based on environmental 
cues. Basing meme replication -- “by definition” -- on imitation, as Blackmore does, is just not going to 
work. Imitation is too vague a gloss for what happens during (some kinds of) social transmission. At 
present, the process appears to involve a magical elision of mental substance from one brain to another 
-- much like the sympathetic transference or “contagion at a distance” characteristic of “primitive thought,” 
according to some anthropologists (Hallpike 1979). Once the black box of imitation is opened up, we 
may find the magic disappears, and rather mundane mechanisms are at work. 
Given this general discontent, it seems that any form of social learning, rather than imitation alone, is a 
better psychological foundation for the cultural evolutionary process. Reader and Laland (1999) take the 
famous example of milk bottle-top opening by birds as evidence of the need for this generalization. The 
pecking of bottle-tops has now gone on for many bird-generations, and spread through several 
European countries. Since it is generally felt that birds learn this bit of cleverness not by observing 
others, but by seeing opened bottle-tops, which inspires their own creativity (a process psychologists call 
“stimulus enhancement”), it seemed a pity to exclude such an example from the purview of memetics by 
limiting it to imitation-based diffusion.  
However, if this liberal position on social learning is adopted, many repercussions ensue. For example, 
the phylogenetic history of memes suddenly becomes considerably longer, with birds and perhaps even 
more “primitive” creatures being allowed to have meme-based “protocultures.”  In addition, it means that 
direct contact between hosts is no longer required for memetic transmission, since the source of a 
meme (such as the tit which pecked a bottle-top) can be absent when a new, naive tit arrives on the 
doorstep. It is the artefact left behind -- that is, the pecked bottle-top itself -- which serves as the 
proximate stimulus for transmission of the pecking meme to the new arrival.  
Allowing memes to be learned through any social mechanism implies, then, that memetics must address 
the issue of artefact production, since memes can be associated with these constructions, and not just 
brains. Laland and Odling-Smee (this volume) hinted at the importance of artefacts with their concept of 
niche construction. I discussed their concept from the “artefacts’-eye-view” previously. In artefact 
replication, humans are catalysts -- they push the “start” button which sets the process in motion. But 
now we see that memes can interact with artefacts as well, in their efforts to find new hosts. I suggest 
that the involvement of artefacts in a meme’s life cycle can be seen as an elaboration of a more primitive 
process of memetic replication through signalling. In memetic social communication, a human source 
produces the catalyst -- a signal such as a gesture or bit of speech -- which causes a meme to be 
replicated in another brain. Such signals are not memes themselves, but rather moving memetic 
enzymes, produced by memetic activity in the message-sender’s brain. On encountering the proper 
conditions -- to wit, an “innocent” brain -- this in-coming message instigates the meme replication 
process in the new host.  
This simple model of memetic replication through communication becomes more complex when what 
might be called a “communicative artefact” steps into the middle of the communication process. In this 
case, message-senders create artefacts rather than signals -- for example, written messages rather than 
speech. These artefacts lay “dormant” in the environment, during which time they lie in wait for new 
hosts to infect. For example, words printed on paper can serve as a template for ambient light striking 
the paper, creating a catalytic signal that passes from the paper-artefact to a naive individual’s eyes. 
This recipient individual, in turn -- and in good Sperberian style -- reconstructs the meme based on this 
“impoverished stimulus,” using local mental resources. In this way, memes don’t need to physically pass 
from brain to brain, and so don’t need to adopt phemotypic forms such as signals themselves. 
Nevertheless, the “replication through communication” problem is solved because a new meme appears 
in the recipient brain which is causally connected to the source meme through the information provided 
by the message-catalyst. Sperber’s inheritance condition is thus satisfied. And the process is replication 
as defined by Dawkins (1982; cited earlier) because the message has influenced the likelihood of a 
meme copy appearing; indeed, that is exactly the role a catalyst should perform in such a chain of 
events.  
But remember that words printed on paper can also be part of a chain of artefact replication, as when 
they get photocopied. Thus communicative artefacts are the junction-point for two replication processes: 
that reproducing the artefacts themselves, and that producing new meme-copies. So technological 
development -- at least in cases of communicative artefacts -- can reflect the evolutionary interests not 
only of the artefacts themselves, but also those of the memes and people that interact with them. The 
difficulties of dealing with meme-artefact interactions are rarely discussed in the memetic literature, but 
such a complex phenomenon obviously requires attention if a comprehensive picture of meme 
replication is to be achieved.  
 Mental Darwinism 
A second major point of contention is whether the memetic dynamic can be extended into the brain. Can 
we call individual learning a selection process just like the social transmission process (Changeux 1997 
[1985])?  This proposal has met with considerable disdain, and -- at least among academic 
psychologists -- is definitely a minority position (Henry Plotkin, personal communication). Blackmore, in 
particular, is adamant that whatever is happening inside the head should not be considered part of the 
memetic process; even if decision-making is in fact selectionist, it still should be treated as an 
independent replicator system in her view. This may be wise, given the possibility that the meme 
concept becomes vacuous when extended to cover replication in too many contexts. 
However, including selection among alternative mental representations as an intrinsic part of the life 
cycle of a meme may be crucial to a successful memetics. Two benefits result from this conceptual 
move. First, only through an analysis of mental properties and processes can good models of 
transmission mechanisms, such as imitation, be understood. Second, by extending the Darwinian 
process into the brain (“Mental Darwinism”), one can avoid the confusion of thinking being called 
“directed,” “intentionalist” or “Lamarkian.” Instead of invoking a wholly new kind of process, one can 
simply suggest that decision-making is selection among memetic altenatives tossed up by some 
variation-producing process. In the end, the same substrate is involved -- neurons. So whether the 
selection process occurs in the same brain or in different ones, it is all memetic (except that inter-brain 
replication involves the communication problem identified by Sperber above).5 
Indeed, a great divide separates the Mental Darwinists (usually motivated by evolutionary thinking) from 
the Intentionalists (usually psychologists or social scientists). Intentionalists don’t see any way to avoid 
issues of meaning when describing human social activity, while the Mental Darwinists argue there is no 
need to engage in this intentionalist subjectivism to understand memetic processes. Any mental 
selectionist would prefer to naturalize psychology rather than make the many fine distinctions concerning 
the motivation behind information transmission (such as Conte’s elaborate typology in this volume), 
regarding them as irrelevant to social dynamics.  
Sperber agrees with Conte that it is absolutely crucial to distinguish between the commonality of beliefs, 
values and emotions that arise through transmission, and those that result from shared individual 
experiences (such as being in an earthquake) which do not involve any exchange of information 
between individuals. So the need for causal mechanisms that get information from point A to point B is 
clear. What remains unclear is whether this necessitates a turn toward intentionalism, or what Dennett 
(1971) has called the “intentional stance” (assigning beliefs and values as mental states to others). 
Perhaps such language is simply a necessary short-hand for discussing psychological processes in big-
brained creatures, but should always be understood to be grounded in a Darwinian selection machine at 
the implementation level.  
 
Social science  
To the most pessimistic contributors, both social anthropologists (Kuper and Bloch), memetics is -- at 
best -- a promise at present, with no real results to show for itself.  The question for these critics is 
whether memetics will ever contribute anything new to the explanation of society. For a variety of 
reasons, these anthropologists believe the answer to this question is no.   
 
Ignorance of history 
The primary reason for their cynicism is that they believe a quasi-epidemiological approach similar to 
memetics is already in widespread use in the social sciences, and indeed has a long (but 
undistinguished) history in those disciplines. In their chapters, both social anthropologists go through an 
historical account of socio-cultural theory in anthropology to argue that memetics is old news -- and what 
is more, bad news. In particular, the idea that some cultures are more stable, or produce a higher quality 
of life because certain ideas spread better than others, has long been around. Thus, existing 
explanations for steadfast traditions and similarity in beliefs and values exist which do not invoke memes. 
However, such evolutionist approaches have been discarded, and superior theories have superceded 
them. Memeticists miss this “Big Picture” because they are largely unaware of the comprehensive 
literature which has accumulated in anthropology concerning cultural change, or the actual history of 
earlier views such as the cultural diffusionists of the early twentieth century (Bloch’s target in particular). 
Being ignorant of the history of diffusionist thought in the social sciences, memeticists are simply 
condemned to repeat its mistakes.  
What remains particularly unclear to these critics is the central claim of memetics: whether there is a 
novel replicator-based process underlying the population-level, epidemiological dynamic that is culture 
change. The primary problem of memetics, from this perspective, is whether there is a new entity on the 
horizon in whose interests things can be said to happen (the “meme’s eye view”). This replicator would 
introduce a new kind of functionality which a social institution might serve: that of the memes. As such, it 
would represent a real and novel alternative to group-level functionalism, or the various flavors of 
structuralist thought current in the social sciences. Unfortunately, the central claim -- that a “meme’s-
eye-view” exists -- has not yet been proven. 
These anthropologists also insist that there is a problem of circularity in memetic arguments. 
Memeticists only study things which seem likely to follow a memetic process, like fashions and fads. The 
perceived success of such empirical adventures leads memeticists to self-congratulation. But many 
aspects of culture aren’t small, isolatable bits of information or practices that readily diffuse in observable 
time. Take the example of language, which permeates every aspect of culture. How does memetics 
expect to explain these more fundamental components of culture?  
For some, even the word “meme” itself provokes problems. Its close parallel to “gene” may lead 
memetics astray, they argue, if in fact memes are not the same kind of thing. It also produces a 
“revulsion factor” among those who would otherwise be friendly to the Darwinian cause. Memetics is 
perceived by those outside the brotherhood as an arrogant usurper of territory, making extreme, 
unwarranted claims. This only serves to put memetics in the same basket with an earlier, related attempt 
at explaining human social life, sociobiology, which was widely seen as what Dennett (1995) calls 
“greedily reductionist.” Sociobiology left no ground for social scientists to stand on, and all the interesting 
questions were subsumed under a single algorithm: the maximization of biological fitness. This is 
unpalatable to social scientists not just because of territoriality disputes, but because such reductionism 
is bound to failure. Thus, an undercurrent in the somewhat scornful reaction of even sympathetic social 
scientists to memetics is the perception that the social sciences will be “preempted” (Rosenberg 1981) 
by these evolutionary theories.  
But in fact, this threat does not exist, as Plotkin (this volume) is anxious to point out. Can all social 
processes really be reduced to selection and transmission? The box of concepts available from 
Darwinism doesn’t impress these social scientists. Memetics seems to employ a very small toolkit when 
so many theoretical alternatives are already available and there is so much complexity to explain. In fact, 
theory abounds in the social sciences. What is lacking is insight into real social processes. Explaining 
these seems a goal quite far removed from the concerns of most memeticists, who are laboring much 
further down the organizational hierarchy, worrying about replicators. An uphill battle against a wide 
variety of other approaches therefore lies ahead for memetics in the social realm.  
In sum, memetics is seen as simply another case of those from outside the discipline, in this case largely 
biologists, “having a go at explaining culture,” but without taking into account many of the complexities 
this project is widely recognized to entail. The meme critics are happy with the general notion that 
cultural change involves the diffusion of some vaguely characterized entity, but not with an explanation 
couched solely in terms of the selection, variation and inheritance of a particulate replicator. 
 Confusions about culture 
The truly dismaying consequence of this critique is that -- as the social scientists themselves admit -- 
they do not have a viable alternative account of cultural change. What memeticists, in their general 
ignorance of social theory, also do not recognize is that the concept of culture -- the very thing which 
memetics intends to explain -- is itself sufficiently problematic that some social scientists advocate its 
abandonment. In their view, the notion simply covers too complex and varied a set of processes to be 
useful. (What exactly would replace the concept of culture, or what sub-concepts it should be divided 
into, is not obvious, however.) So, in some sense, the explanatory target memetics aims at -- culture -- is 
disappearing into thin air like the Cheshire cat.  
At the same time, the anthropological enterprise is itself in serious trouble. So the question suggests 
itself: Is the major problem with the notion of memes themselves, or with the target it is meant to explain: 
culture? Those who take culture seriously, as the social scientists here do, find it hard to pin down their 
own conceptions of this central concept. One can only speak of an impossibly complex tangle of beliefs, 
behaviors and social institutions, as well as psychological predispositions and emotions, distributed 
through all the members of a society. Because all these things are linked, no possibility of reduction is 
admitted. As a consequence of this conceptual confusion, the project of explaining short-term cultural 
changes has in large part been abandoned by contemporary anthropologists.  
But anthropologists admit that culture is distributed. If we can agree that much of cultural knowledge is 
socially learned, this implies that such knowledge necessarily diffuses through populations, from 
individual to individual. All sensory modalities require inputs in the form of temporal streams of 
information -- such as words forming sentences, and sentences paragraphs. At this basic level, 
individuals therefore must acquire information in bits (which need not be binary). So something like a 
unit of transmission must exist. If we can’t speak of culture as a phenomenon that can be isolated, then 
perhaps we can still talk about the problem of how the ideational components of culture are learned 
through the social transmission of stimuli. The question then becomes how these units of transmission 
become translated or incorporated into the body of knowledge and practice that is culture. This is, in fact, 
Sperber’s question -- and that of all the psychologists who assert that the psychology of transmission or 
communication is black-boxed by memetic evolutionists.  
So regardless of the complexity of “culture” as a psychological construct in each person’s mind, or as a 
set of practices and institutions, the informational components underlying the behavioral commonalities 
of culture (even in the standard anthropological view) must go through channels, migrating from mind to 
mind. And culture in this form -- if you like, exposed to the air as a stream of words, for instance -- can 
be studied in its own right. Indeed, the transmission process -- the foundation of how culture, in all its 
manifestations, is maintained -- is the rightful domain of memetics. How the bits of cultural knowledge 
get reassembled once they have reached a new, impressionable mind -- another fundamental process -- 
is the rightful domain of psychology. (But, as I have argued earlier, it is also one with important clues 
about how information acquired culturally is transformed before being sent out again into the social 
realm.)  
The open question is whether these bits of information acquired through social transmission can 
themselves influence the likelihood they will be further transmitted. Do acquired units of exchanged 
knowledge have causal efficacy in human affairs independent of the wills of people themselves? In other 
words, are there memes? 
Many arguments in the social sciences still center around the question of “agency,” or the levels of 
causation. As Holy and Stulchik (1983:2) put it, the question concerning the level at which human 
behavior is caused is: 
 
“basically about the autonomy of agency: if society, or structure, is an objective reality to whose 
demands people respond in specific ways, then it is an autonomous agency and individual people are its 
agents, and the ony acceptable explanation is in terms of the functioning of the [social] system. If, on the 
other hand, society or structure emerges from, and is maintained or changed only by what people do, 
then individuals are autonomous agents and systems are the consequences of their actions and, in the 
last instance, explicable by them.” 
This question -- individual or group -- has been at the center of the scientific status of social science 
since its beginnings -- with Durkheim, for example, falling on the top-down side of causative directionality, 
while methodological individualists, such as Rosenberg (1985), fall on the bottom-up side. Dawkins 
(1976) added a new, “lower” level of agency to biological theory by emphasizing that adaptations might 
reflect the interests of genes rather than individuals or groups. Similarly, Dawkins’ original meme 
suggestion indicated that a new, lower level of agency might also be relevant to the explanation of social 
facts. The “meme’s eye view” shifts the location of cultural agency below the standard “floors” of 
individuals or groups to the “basement” level of information itself. However, such a hoary controversy as 
that concerning the location of agency is unlikely to be settled here. And even if replication is found to 
underpin some cultural knowledge acquisition, it is unlikely to be the whole picture, as Sperber (this 
volume) argues. So it is improbable that memetics will ever provide a full account of cultural change; 
some aspects of cultural continuity will be due to the push and pull between genes and environment. 
There has been an implicit dualism of the agency debate, with the available alternatives have typically 
been presented as an “either/or” choice. That is, either individuals are assumed to be fully independent 
agents, or individuals’ cultural repertoires are thought to be fully determined by the society in which they 
live. A similar restriction has also infected the debate about memes. But in fact it seems likely that 
individual learning direct from the natural (exogenous) environment can co-occur with social learning, 
both from other members of the society, as well as from capitalized resources such as books. I think 
Laland and Odling-Smee’s concept of environmental inheritance through niche construction goes a long 
way toward handling the additional complexity of culture as outlined by Kuper and Bloch. The “built 
environment” (including technologies for information storage such as books and computers) which 
certainly constrains human action, is after all a consequence of the activities of previous generations. 
Having three forms of inheritance (genes, memes and artefacts) is a means by which a sophisticated 
theory of mutual constraint relations between individual, societal and cultural replicator levels can be 
constructed within an explicitly evolutionary framework.  
 
Progress in memetics? 
In the general struggle to understand culture, there is a clear trend for increasing divergence between 
groups, with decreasing mutual intelligibility. One line is becoming centered around cultural studies, 
while the other seeks refuge in science.  Memes are perhaps more and more likely to be the rallying cry 
for Darwinists of all stripes when discussing culture, while simultaneously being an object of derision 
among those inspired by the humanities. Memetics may thus play its small part in the increasing division 
among researchers. Perhaps the debate is not really about memes at all, but rather more a matter of 
temperament than anything else. At bottom, whether you “like” memes may be simply due to whether 
you are a splitter or a lumper, a believer in analysis or interpretation.  
Although it is obvious that despite the shared belief among those collected here that some kind of 
evolutionary approach to culture is necessary, significant barriers to communication remain between 
those from different disciplines. This perhaps derives from the varying histories these disciplines have 
had with evolutionary approaches. Biologists are predisposed to look at issues of transmission because 
inheritance is central to their subject, while those trained in the social sciences have been more 
interested in structure and function -- which have traditionally been answered without attention to 
dynamics, much less the more specific question of transmission. Nevertheless, social anthropology has 
a long history of evolutionary thought, broadly speaking, which has generally not proven successful. 
Indeed, a common refrain among social anthropologists seems to be “been there, done that.” It will be 
difficult for believers in memes to convince these historically mindful and hence reticent social scientists 
that this time around things might be different. Similarly, it has proven difficult for the anthropologists to 
explain exactly what went wrong with previous incarnations of cultural evolutionism, or specifically how 
the memetic perspective is likely to go wrong itself, even if given a clear run at explaining culture.  
But other factors besides academic background also seem to dictate use of the word “meme” in 
scientific circles. For example, the teams of Boyd-Richerson and Laland-Odling-Smee both use the 
same formalism for investigating cultural evolution. But one team rejects while the other accepts the idea 
of particulate, transmissable units of information as necessary components of the explanation of culture. 
While Boyd and Richerson may be more enamored of the theoretical possibility of non-particulate 
inheritance, Laland and Odling-Smee appear to be more impressed by the need for replication to effect 
transmission. Other rejections of memes are probably idiosyncratic or, perhaps, reflect the continuing 
confusion surrounding the word “meme.” Given this multi-layered resistence to memetics, it may be 
wiser to follow the progress of evolutionary cultural studies more generally, rather than the meme idea 
per se, for a true indication of who is winning the battle to explain culture. 
 
Applying memetics 
The question of whether memetics has an empirical future remains open. Among partisans and 
detractors alike, a major disappointment with the current status of the field is the lack of studies in what 
might be called “applied memetics.” Hull (this volume) argues that we should all just go out and “do it.” 
However, it is not clear that such an approach will be successful if I am correct about the need to identify 
the responsible mechanisms underlying cultural inheritance. Instead, I would suggest memetics must 
first establish how cultural traits maintain themselves in similar forms through generations. Perhaps 
many mechanisms will be involved, as it is possible there will be as many mechanisms as there are 
media for social learning.  
So we need to develop specific methodologies for conducting memetic studies. There should also be 
more discussion of existing empirical studies that weren’t undertaken under the banner of memetics but 
which could be interpreted as falling within the general purview of this incipient discipline.   
It may be that it won’t be possible to conduct empirical research in this area for the simple reason that 
the process being investigated is too complex. From my own experience (Aunger 2000), I would suggest 
that the prospects for fruitful empirical studies in memetics are daunting. Despite dogged concentration 
on a highly restricted question (transmission of a limited set of beliefs in a “simple” oral society), and the 
application of various multivariate statistical techniques, I have been unable to provide a quantitative 
estimate of the relative strengths of intra- and inter-generational transmission. On the other hand, a 
rather more limited transmission science may be possible -- and valuable. For example, the exact 
magnitude of selection coefficients are often unknown in biological studies, but also without much 
interest: what we really want to know is whether selection is directional rather than neutral, and to 
identify the selecting agent.  The answers to these kinds of questions can get us a long way toward an 
understanding of the evolution of the system under study and may be possible for a future memetics.  
At any rate, as even David Hull (this volume) acknowledges, given the extensive theoretical work 
already accomplished and the high level of current interest in the subject, something substantial can 
rightfully be expected of memetics in the relatively near term -- either by way of correct, novel predictions 
derived from the meme hypothesis, or proof that cultural entities with the characteristics of replicators 
exist. This is because the ultimate test -- which would preempt theoretical objections -- is whether 
memetics can produce novel empirical work or insightful interpretations of previous results. It has not yet 
done so, but must do so in the near future. Otherwise, it is likely that memetics will be perceived to be a 
misguided enterprise. The clock is ticking. 
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Footnotes 
1 This is not the conclusion Laland and Odling-Smee necessarily intend us to draw when they assert 
niche construction can be important, but their framework can switch the burden of explaining technology 
from cultural to ecological inheritance. 
 
2 Some (e.g., Blackmore 1999) see the development of human language as an early example of gene-
meme cooperation: “digitized” signalling achieves increased fidelity for memes during transmission, 
while grammatical structure allows increased sophistication in message-passing for human social 
coordination. But language is subject to the problem associated with any form of communication: the 
need to transform brain-language to a public code and back again. See the section on memetic 
phenotyes for a discussion of this difficulty. 
 
3 Actually, there are various models of replication within brains -- see Delius 1991; Calvin 1997; Aunger 
1999 -- but none that work at the neuroscientific level between brains, which is what I’m talking about 
here.   
 
4 Given this basic level of uncertainty about the nature of memes, it seems to me premature to start 
making distinctions among memes as a number of authors have done. Plotkin’s distinction (in this 
volume) between “surface-” and “deep-level” memes is similar to the standard one in psychology 
between procedural and descriptive knowledge, or, roughly speaking, between a knowledge of things 
and how to do things with things. Scott Atran (1998) recently distinguished between “core” and 
“developing” memes. Core memes are acquired through informationally-encapsulated modules designed 
by natural selection; developing memes fall into the cracks between modules, and therefore having to be 
processed by some amalgam of processing units. Core memes therefore last longer, are more reliably 
acquired, and generally have the desirable features of good replicators, in Atran’s opinion. Such 
distinctions depend not only on a good knowledge of how encapsulated information processing 
algorithms are, but also about how memes might interact with this mental architecture. This makes such 
propositions doubly “courageous.” I think we first need to establish that there are memes (as mental 
entities) before we start dividing them into species (Aunger 1998).  
 
5 An unfortunate consequence of a selectionist psychology is the appearance it gives of there being no 
room for human agency in decision-making; that all human psychology is merely a random selection 
process among alternative behavioral choices. But of course the abandonment of intentionality and free 
will would be hailed as a victory for memetics by hard-core Mental Darwinists.  
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